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Ecological Grief and Anthropocene Horror 
Timothy Clark 
“Today every question is already the question of everything” (Maurice Blanchot). 
 
This paper contrasts what it schematizes as “ecological grief” with a 
broader, more common but conceptually elusive phenomenon of 
“Anthropocene horror.” Ecological grief was described in this issue’s call for 
papers as “an emotional experience brought on by the actual or anticipated 
loss of cherished natural spaces, ecosystems, species, etc. caused by 
environmental change” (see Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018).  For the purposes of 
this exercise I take “ecological grief” to be grief for the loss or threatened 
destruction of a specific landscape, place or species, as opposed to what 
might be called “Anthropocene horror.” This phrase is used to name a 
sense of horror about the changing environment globally, usually as 
mediated by news reports and expert predictions, giving a sense of threats 
that need not be anchored to any particular place, but which are both 
everywhere and anywhere. “Anthropocene horror” is something familiar to 
environmental activists of various kinds but which is now being experienced 
by an increasing portion of the world population. This paper tries to 
articulate some of its most striking features.  
     In an earlier study I suggested a concept of “Anthropocene disorder.” 1 
My sketch of “Anthropocene horror” essentially reiterates that argument, 
but with the phrase altered to stress the affective aspects of the condition, 
especially its sense of powerlessness, in accordance with the overall focus 
of this issue of American Imago. The global environmental crisis (usually 
loosely called the “Anthropocene”), is being experienced as a source of 
many different affects for different people and contexts. Nevertheless, an 
emergent  sense  of “Anthropocene horror” (henceforth AH) seems 
distinctive enough for it to be worth trying to delineate as a specific affective 
spectrum, even if  experience on that spectrum ranges from one of intense 
despair about the future, at its most extreme,  to a mere sense of unease, 
or even affects associated with  denial. All these are variously felt by 
various people, or even by the same person at different times. 2  
    AH is being lived as a pervasive affect in daily life, not as an easily 
compartmentalised emotion. It need not be a response to some obviously 
perceptible assault on the natural environment, but may even or perhaps 
especially affect someone living in and surrounded by a “developed” 
infrastructure. “Grief” may still suggest a lack of implication in the loss, but 
“horror” is more appropriate when part of the sadness at issue is from living 
in a context of latent environmental violence and feeling personally trapped 
in its wrongs.   
     Intense ecological grief and its attendant identity crises tend to be 
suffered by people who are the most vulnerable to environmental change 
for reasons of poverty, social status or mode of livelihood. In a paper 
subtitled “Understanding Ecological grief” Neville Ellis and Ashlee Cunsolo 
refer to the forms of grief undergone by people in the far north of Canada 
and in the Western Australian wheat belt, both facing severe 
impoverishment and a collapse of their way of life as a result of climate 
change (Cunsolo and Ellis, 2014). Attending this derangement of old 
norms and dependencies is a proliferation of anxiety disorders, and what 
has been described as a paradoxical kind of PTSD in advance (Grose, 
2019).  AH, on the other hand, may already affect anyone anywhere. As an 
affect in everyday life, AH is by far the more complex and conceptually 
elusive of the two states, and clearly the less immediately painful.  
     The context of AH is even that of a certain lack of realizable feeling. 
Henri Lefèbvre criticizes the loose way modern people continually mistake 
basic reality: “the conflation of the terms “planet,” “earth,” “worldwide,” 
“world” and “universe” is […]  rather ridiculous” (Lefèbvre, 1995, 254).   
Lefèbvre was writing in the early 1960s, but this point about the weakness 
of our conceptions can read even more provocatively in the twenty-first 
century. It underlines the fact that we have no immediate felt sense of the 
earth as a finite planet in our basic constitution or perception. Unlike our 
sense of distance in those realms we can see, hear or walk through, that 
the earth is a finite totality is something we learn about in growing up (and a 
few people even now do not credit it).  
     This lack of any earth-sense will not have mattered in the days of sailing 
ships and horse-power, but it is now become, more or less by accident, a 
possibly fatal human flaw. It renders us vulnerable to all the social, cultural 
and economic pressures that constitute, effectively, a daily life geared to 
climate change denial. There is a dangerous mismatch between the 
dynamics of individual personhood and the contemporary context. David 
Wood writes: 
Our palette of affective responses is the product of evolutionary 
history, in which individual and group reproductive success and 
survival have been the selective mechanisms. But the circumstances 
in which our passions organize themselves to promote survival and 
flourishing have changed. (Wood, 2019, p. 126) 
 
   This affective mismatch is the assumed context for numerous eco-
philosophical projects whose primary aim is to help create a felt sense of 
the human defined in relation to the earth. For example, Clive  Hamilton 
argues for a new “deep, pre-ethical sense of responsibility” gauged to the 
fragility of the earth (Hamilton, 2017, p. 149), one which “cannot belong to 
the individual or to the citizen of a nation … but to the human who feels the 
inescapable responsibility that comes with the unique and extraordinary 
place of humankind on planet Earth” (Hamilton, 2017, p. 149; emphasis 
added).  Wood writes: “[My] book is indeed in many ways an attempt at the 
performative constitution of a species-subject” (Wood, 2019, p. 35). 
Numerous other thinkers see their work as contributing to this same 
project. To induce this subjective condition is a major ethical project of the 
environmental humanities, accompanying critiques of the rapacity of global 
capitalism.  
     A feeling or an identity which needs to be constructed and argued for is 
clearly one that barely already exists, however strongly ecocritics like 
myself try to imagine that we possess it. On the other hand, “ecological 
grief” in an immediate sense is becoming a common experience, and 
seems even too tame a phrase to cover the experience of people across 
the world suffering from an increasing number of climate-related disasters, 
such as fierce cyclones or more intense periods of drought. 
     When the context is the immediately perceptible damage wrought by the 
government or some specific capitalist development, ecological grief can 
be structured as a simple dichotomy of bereft human and lost creature or 
place, and it can support fairly clearly-cut kinds of local environmental 
politics in which the antagonists are both defined and understood. This was 
the stance of many earlier, “first wave” ecocritics and innumerable 
environmental activists campaigning on a specific issue—the stance 
celebrated in Edward Abbey’s The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975), for 
instance. It can be a politically energizing and powerful source of anger and 
possible change. Such grief can also be called “ecological” in the very 
loose sense of affirming, by implication, a seeming norm or condition of 
things undamaged or less damaged by human interference. In that sense 
the feeling of pain has been argued to have an ethically normative element, 
one that makes it also an affirmation of value, even in loss.  
   This was often the normative concept of such grief at work in texts of so-
called “eco-psychology”. There is a long tradition, reaching back to 
Romantic period literature, for which the hurt of environmental loss is   also 
testimony to a supposedly deeper sense of the human as “in touch with/at 
one with nature” or to a more “natural” human being. Thus, ecological grief 
could be argued to question individualistic and instrumentalist notions of 
personhood for which relations with the environment are understood 
primarily in consumerist terms of the supply and demand of basic material 
needs, and with the very idea of a person “increasingly identified [solely] 
with internal experiences dissociated from the world itself”(Kidner, 2001,  
p.49). Modern psychology, Kidner writes, “has failed to foster a realistic 
awareness of our place in the natural world, but rather …  it has actively 
contributed to the construction and legitimation of a form of personhood 
that is inherently hostile to nature” (Kidner, 2001, p.51) Kidner writes of the 
assumed “private” and” inward” nature of personal identity according to 
dominant, popular Western conceptions: 
As we move “inward,” so we approach a realm that is more and more 
intensely personal and that has less and less to do with the “external 
context” of our lives. For us, personal identity resides in this 
detachment from the world, in the ease with which we can distinguish 
ourselves from the world. And our way of life reflects this distancing: 
we strive to control, predict, master what is outside us, minimizing 
any resonances between the self and natural patterns in the 
“environment,” and downplaying the significance of those patterns 
that exist in the world. (Kidner, 2001, p. 172).  
     “Ecological grief,” on this reading, would become the most intense 
realization of the underlying but often unfelt alienation and repressions of 
modern personhood. At the same time the romantic streak in eco-
psychology, idealizing “ecological grief” as the pain of some more “natural” 
humanity, would need to be resisted. Studies of prehistory and of 
numerous historical civilizations suggest that the destructive and 
exploitative have always characterized the human species and its hominin 
ancestors. Grief felt at the spectacle of environmental violence may be 
deep, but it is barely “ecological” as the token of some “natural” humanity 
waiting to be restored. 3  
AH: The Inchoate and Unprecedented  
Ecological grief at the loss or destruction of particular place is an emotion 
felt personally, as an affront to those who valued that place, creature or 
ecosystem: it has the sense of a personal assault. AH is often less 
individualizing in that sense, being horror at a shared prospect, which is felt 
less as an affront to “me” in particular, than a sense of social malaise, like 
widespread social and political failure. Given that its concern embraces the 
whole earth, its anger may drift into a resigned paralysis. Wood writes: 
in the absence of obviously available forms of collective agency, a 
whole range of public responses – resignation, anger, apathy, 
ressentiment  – are entirely understandable. (They are plausible 
responses both to local political failure and to the seemingly 
intractable prospect of serious climate change.) (Wood, 2019, p. 131) 
     Relevant here is the broad academic consensus on differentiating 
concepts of “affect” from concepts of “emotion.” The former is a 
“precognitive bodily feeling”, while the emotions are distinguished as 
“consciously interpreted or narrated affects”. That is, they are feelings that 
have become articulate in language, and, perhaps, also in politics or action 
(see Bladow and Ladino, 2018, p. 5). Ecological grief is clearly an 
“emotion” in this sense, ripe to be weaponized in environmental politics. 
AH, on the other hand, remains for many a present but subdued and barely 
realized affect, a background unease to be met even by indifference or 
denial. This is a long way from what Sianne Ngai has called “the classical 
political passion–feelings like anger, grief, and love.” (Ngai, 2005, p. 5). To 
transmute this affective background into forms of politically motivating 
passion, remains the work of people busy in green politics of various kinds. 
  When realized at its clearest AH is a felt response to an understanding 
that human impacts have passed a threshold at which what was once just 
taken for granted in daily life has crossed over from the normal to the 
destructive. This means that, say, the sight of a busy road or a large field of 
crops, or, for many, even a government paper extolling “increased growth,” 
can induce as real a feeling of horror as the sight of a felled forest or 
plastic-choked waterway. Much that was recently normal transmutes, 
without any alteration in its separate make-up, into something latently 
violent.   Daily life can feel on the way to being a personal realization of a 
form of Salvador Dali’s paranoiac-critical method, his technique of working 
out of a deliberately induced state of paranoia in which one’s surroundings 
seem the expression of malign forces on the attack (see Finkelstein, 1996). 
At the same time, someone suffering badly from AH is bound to seem 
“unbalanced” from the viewpoint of others in “normal” life, as most 
environmental activists know only too well.    
   Clive Hamilton expresses a sense of AH when he highlights the intensely 
felt inadequacy of inherited ethical thinking when faced with a newly 
realized sense of derangement to the workings of the Earth System, that 
“An ethical framework that can tell us whether it is wrong to overstate our 
travel expenses cannot tell us whether it is wrong to change the Earth’s 
geological history” (Hamilton, 2017, p. 148). Hamilton continues:  
When we step back and survey the epoch-stopping force of 
anthropogenic climate change and mass extinctions our established 
ethical categories and legal principles appear banal and feeble. If the 
human impact has been so powerful that it has deflected the Earth 
from its natural geological path, describing the state of affairs as 
“unethical” or “unlawful” seem to be some kind of category error. 
(Hamilton, 2017, p. 148)  
Merely given ethical language “risks normalizing an event without parallel, 
… rendering prosaic a transition that is in fact Earth-shattering” (Hamilton, 
2017, pp.148-149).  Compare Matthias Frisch on our duties to future 
generations: “constituting a new and different world in which future people 
will live, many of the large-scale actions that present generations engage 
in, it seems, are beyond inherited moral notions” (Frisch, 2018, p. 37; 
(emphasis added).  Hamilton concludes: “So I think we have to confront the 
most difficult truth – in the Anthropocene we have no ethical resources to 
draw on” (Hamilton, 2017, p. 155).   
    The “Anthropocene” demands a new awareness, beyond given ethics, of 
what might be called the “pre-ethical” dimension of life as that which is now 
at stake. This means something beyond the ethical in the sense of inherited 
norms of behavior, namely,  the very condition of possibility for such norms 
in the once taken-for-granted background workings of what scientists  call 
the Earth System, with its various climatic and environmental thresholds in 
terms of the carbon and nitrogen cycles, biodiversity levels and so on. 
Wood describes “our assumption that human life will continue into the 
foreseeable future … [,] [as] a horizon that gives our own lives meaning” 
(Wood, 2019, p. 71). Yet it is the depth of this very assumption that now 
makes it also so dangerously taken-for-granted, enabling such things as 
the irrationality of climate change denial.    
     This taken-for-granted horizon is precisely what risks being elided or 
overlooked in the fact that we have no direct perception or sense of the 
earth as a finite planet in our basic sensorium. Frighteningly, it is because 
the Earth System thresholds at issue are so fundamental that they are also 
so deeply presupposed, taken-for-granted, overlooked (as in the confused 
categories highlighted by Lefèbvre), or their fragility denied.  Wood is 
effectively writing of this possibly fatal absence when he writes:  
One explanation of why we are not addressing future climate catastrophe 
might well be that addressing it threatens the future horizon at any level we 
can make sense of. We can at best contemplate action within such 
fundamental frames. The idea that the horizon itself is in question is simply 
impossible to accept. (Wood, 2019, p. 70) 
     AH is then most often a feeling of inadequacy, of being the target of 
ethical demands that exceed anything one could do in combating global 
environmental wrongs, and, more worryingly, a realization of the 
incongruously anachronistic nature of given ethical discourse.  
     At issue is a condition of closure, after the sense of Jacques Derrida’s 
well-known use of the term (“the closure of metaphysics”). Closure does 
not mean “end” here: it means a sense of known entrapment within the 
repetition of conceptual, ethical social and political assumptions and 
structures which seem both unavoidable but also known to be 
environmentally destructive and intellectually anachronistic. This can 
induce a fatalistic sense of a zombification of human life, both with the 
spectacle of the destructively self-perpetuating dynamics of international 
capitalism and in the becoming- destructive of so much once seemingly 
indifferent human behavior.  
      AH entails a feeling of entrapment.  One of the traditional   functions of 
the concept of nature was to name a space of supposed externality, not the 
other of “culture”, but more literally its outside. But as Wood writes:  
Now there is no outside, no space for expansion, no more terra 
nullius, no Lebensraum no slack, no “out” or “away” as when we 
throw something “out” or “away”. …. Yet so much of our making 
sense, let alone the intelligibility of our actions, still rests on being 
able to export, exclude, externalize what we do not want to consider. 
When that externality is no longer available, we are in trouble. (Wood, 
2005, pp. 172-173). 
The end of “externality” means that the consequences of human action do 
not go away any more. To stand on a remote mountain top is effectively still 
to breathe the atmosphere of overwhelming numbers of other people.  
     The claustrophobic feeling of AH has, ironically perhaps, been 
unwittingly intensified by the impact of work in the environmental 
humanities. Its work has often been to analyze and demonstrate how 
deeply elements of culture that may once have seemed quite separate are 
in fact implicated in environmental violence – the politics and psychology of 
notions of private property, for instance, or various forms of gender or of  
identity politics, or the implication of consumerism in the loss of rain forests 
to vast palm oil plantations. Environmental violence, however latent, is thus 
being read as inhabiting more and more of what earlier may have naively 
seemed at least ecologically indifferent, and such forms of awareness enter 
culture more broadly. For an intellectual or an activist these insights can be 
illuminating and helpful, for others it may seem like contamination, or 
inducing a kind of ethical claustrophobia. Is a recoil from this even part of 
the current spectacle of an appalling right-wing politics in the USA or Brazil, 
with leaderships for whom cutting down the Amazon forest or mining a 
national park gets touted as a gesture of libertarian freedom? 
The “Panic Question” 
I turn now to the experience of AH at its sharpest and least entangled in 
denial, the kind of experience undergone by people most attuned to so-
called “green issues”, even without the grief of environmental loss in their 
immediate context. Here AH is becoming the kind of crisis best known to 
some thinking in existential philosophy.  
     A reference suggests itself here to Martin Heidegger’s distinction 
between “fear” and “anxiety” (see Elpidorou and Freeman (2010)). Fear 
concerns a specific object in the world, whereas anxiety concerns no 
specific object within the world, but relates to “the whole horizon of this 
being-in-the-world”. Gregers Andersen uses just a such distinction to 
outline the uncertainly anxious modes of being addressed in some so-
called cli-fi literature, such as Helen Simpson’s short story “Diary of an 
Interesting Year” set in a future of collapsing norms and broken 
infrastructure (Simpson, 2011, pp. 116-128) (Andersen, 2016). Likewise, 
whereas environmental grief is a response to specific loss, AH is a more 
diffuse, an ineradicable but not specifically locatable concern with the 
horizon of our being-in the-world itself.   
     Michel Haar writes: “Anxiety makes the subject no longer know who it is. 
It takes part in its own “wild” deconstruction, if one can put it that way. This 
“one” is no longer a subject but an indeterminate presence which feels 
invaded by a feeling of uncanniness” (Haar, 1993, p. 45). Such 
Heideggerian anxiety has a broad catalyst now in that the global 
environmental crisis is also a crisis of human agency.  For,  despite the 
“Anthropocene” nickname, the supposed emergence of humanity as a 
pseudo-geological force is not the manifestation of deliberate human 
agency, but of a realm of unintended consequences in the Earth System, 
one in which “humanity” is felt to become weirdly impersonalized, the total 
effect of its actions disjunct from the plans or aims of individual people or 
nations. My personal desires, ideals, and ambitions, the realization of my 
“self” etc., do not register here, but merely the physical side-effects of my 
bodily existence and its various material impacts. The horror being felt is 
one of mocking disjunctions, of the lack of felt connections between, for 
instance, individual actions and collective effects, between how a 
landscape or a forest appears and what is actually happening to it because 
of carbon emissions on other continents, between a benign reality on one 
time-scale and catastrophe on another. The sense of panic in relation to 
what may effectively have already happened is a kind of unanchoring or 
dislocation of the customary relation between emotion and its object.  
      Being trapped in a context which is unprecedented, complex, and at 
work over challenging scales of space and time, AH resists being 
assimilated to any simple narrative. One pertinent distinction between 
affects and emotions is that, in Pieter Vermeulen’s words: “While emotions 
are linked to cognition and meaning and are structured narratively, affects 
are intractable intensities that escape from cognitive or semantic 
determination” (Vermeulen, 2012, p. 557). AH, analogously,  entails a 
sense of dislocation from “normal life” that can induce feelings of the 
senseless, incoherent or ridiculous—but “the ridiculous” becomes here a 
free floating quality, uncertain as to whether it is affixed solely to feelings of 
such dislocation, or to the whole “normal” context itself, or only to one’s 
own dislocated sense in not knowing truly how to respond.  
      Maurice Blanchot’s The Infinite Conversation (originally published 
1969) describes what he terms the “panic experience”. Its formal outline is 
that of a challenge to received norms of thought, politics, or ethics, of a 
disorienting resistance to assimilation or categorization. The “panic 
question”, as a form of existential crisis, is not just the uncontainable 
questioning of everything, as when a questioner goes on repeating “why?,” 
but it is experienced as a blanking out of one’s own subjectivity and 
singular identity, as if having become no-one/anyone in a panicked crowd  
This dimension of the profound question …  this panic relation 
whereby it questions everything by way of what would be outside of 
everything, questioning the “world” by way of a “non-world” where the 
question no longer has a question’s value, dignity or power, is not at 
all exceptional. On the contrary, it is constant; it simply slips away.  …  
In all the great movements in which we exist only as interchangeable 
signs, the panic question is there, designating us as anyone at all, 
and depriving us of all power to question. In a crowd our being is that 
of flight. (Blanchot, 1993, p. 19) 
       The affinity of AH to Blanchot’s “panic question” lies in the fact that AH 
is not simply a sense of the threats to specific places, creatures or modes 
of life. It correlates, at a deeper level, with the previously taken-for-granted 
working of the Earth System, something effectively both material and 
transcendental at the same time, as the general condition of possibility for 
current life. The “panic” effect lies in the sense both of the depth and 
opacity of this realm, and its overwhelming of any sense of individual 
relevance or capability in gauging the causes or rationality of the panic.   
     Blanchot seems prophetic of a growing condition, felt in the dislocations 
and derealizations of AH as akin to such a “panic experience”: “’when we 
ask the question: who has been the subject of this experience? This 
question is already perhaps an answer… an indefinite “who?”’”(Blanchot, 
quoted in Derrida, 1995, p. 276). 
     To highlight the unprecedented nature of AH here, one might compare it 
to a well-known argument about the nature of what is “ethical.”  AH seems 
to be a response to the undecidable, the incalculable. It is here that 
Jacques Derrida’s skeptical approach to general ethical theory might seem 
most pertinent, as it relates precisely to that which one cannot decide by 
given norms. In fact, however, in the context of AH Derrida’s argument now 
seems disconcerting partial or anachronistic. For Derrida the ethical is not 
genuinely understood as a set of inherited norms to be followed: the ethical 
intrudes upon us most directly rather as that area, undecidable by general 
rule, in which singular claims or cases are still in need of decision one way 
or another. Geoffrey Bennington sums up:  
 
  If [ethical] “decision” simply meant the expression of my subjective 
will, then it would be no decision  at all, but again, in a different 
register, the mere application of given possibilities to a situation which 
consists precisely in a certain challenge to what is merely possible [in 
the sense of already latent in my nature]. (Bennington, 2000, p. 73) 
 
I find that AH is distinctive in that it is experienced as effectively an 
inversion of what Derrida’s argument describes. The latter seems driven 
more by the idea of what is free as a decision —undetermined, not 
calculable etc. – rather than what is ethical about it. Surely, in many cases 
what is ethical as a decision is also boringly obvious and drearily mundane  
– for example, not poisoning the air, not generating more cfc, not buying a 
car, etc. All are obviously “ethical” while being not at all demanding in terms 
of which decision would be better. The difficulty now, the incipient horror, is 
not the undecidability of the specific case –for example, I already know it 
would be irresponsible to take up a conference invitation that entails flying 
to China. At issue is not the ethical ordeal of being unable to reach a 
decision, but the panic inherent in that decision having no decisiveness. 
    If, for example, my own “greener lifestyle” can have significance only if 
innumerable other people are pursuing something similar, then my own 
actions cannot but drift toward being a kind of performance of virtue only, 
simulative. In the face of AH, Derrida’s stress on what makes a decision 
free, i.e. undetermined, entails a latent even individualistic focus on the 
decision-maker, disregarding a context that already erodes beyond 
recognition notions of individual responsibility and ethical efficacy.4 
     The so-called Anthropocene is horrifying as the manifestation of an 
evident and destructive rift between the facts of what humanity is or has 
become, and this norm of individuals living as rational agents pursuing 
known and coherent purposes or decisions. The latently individualistic 
focus of Derrida’s notion of an “ethical decision” now seems likewise 
anachronistic.  
     A new kind of irony pervades things, skewing the act from the intention 
and the consequence from the ambition. At the same time, we have lived 
for so long with variously frightening possible futures, that even emerging 
news on vast swathes of the arctic being in flame has an insidious sense of 
déjà vu and the inevitable, so its resistance to being felt slides easily into 
being effectively a form of denial. It can also be a feeling of intense panic, 
yet it can seem like the grief of a bereavement, a useless panic at what has 
already happened.  
AH and Simulative Affect 
An account of AH as a kind of existential crisis might ring true for an 
increasing number of people, but it must now be fully acknowledged that 
the kinds of threat and dislocation described are barely felt at all by most 
people in the affairs of day to day life, however deeply those are ultimately 
at stake, whether these are the routine lives  of the prosperous or the day 
to day stresses of material poverty.  
       Ingolfur Blühdorn has theorized a general becoming simulative of 
environmental politics within the contexts of late capitalism (Blühdorn, 
2007). Environmentalism is hollowed out from within by various material 
and psychological pressures toward becoming the partially pretended or 
gesture politics of a context whose basic commitment is still to the 
intellectual and material comforts of the status quo, given the power and 
inertia of capitalism and consumer democracy. It would be simplistic to 
read what Blühdorn describes in terms of personal hypocrisies, for his topic 
is the deep and pervasively reifying effects of late consumerist capitalism.  
      It would often be more appropriate then also to write “AH” with legible 
deletion marks. The deletion denotes the usually simulative nature of AH. 
These signify that what is being described is also pervasive in or as its not 
being felt, as an inherently self-divided attunement to an alarming reality 
that is both known and under-realized, or an affect not yet focused as any 
one specific emotion. It corresponds also to the way in which catastrophe is 
deflected into modes of entertainment in innumerable dystopian films and 
novels. AH is both a feeling and the intimated sense that more ought to be 
felt, hence it is also a disorientation and an unfocused guilt. It is in its not 
being felt that AH is often at its most horrifying. When the affect attains the 
focused sharpness of an articulate emotion, it is emotion of a non-cathartic 
kind, both because it cannot be assuaged and because it is often barely 
there.  
   There is also a purely mathematical factor at work in the general 
becoming-simulative - the depersonalizing and derealizing power of mere 
scale effects, of the psychology, if that is still the word, of being  embedded 
in the impersonal dynamics of very large numbers, their  effect less of 
“divide and rule” than of “multiply-and-neutralize,” underlining the  felt 
insignificance of any and every single act or intention. 
     AH, realized at its more intense, is the sense that much even authentic 
environmental politics and action is also “simulative” in another sense: of 
being policies, thinking, and actions that are genuinely held or performed 
but that are simultaneously known to be inadequate, rendering them 
strangely hollow or imitation. Yet, precisely because the accompanying 
panic involves so much, it also dissolves, loses all contour and blurs into 
panic, the deletion marking the fact that the panic is there, but usually as 
suppressed, even barely felt, also simulative. The horror latent in AH is to 
hear the question that seems to survive any response to it: “how to get 
real?” – and then, necessarily, to do something else. 
         Is it my merely personal affliction with AH that sometimes makes 
academic  ecocriticism, as it becomes more mainstream, also seem  
largely or merely simulative, embedded as it is in the turn-over of the late-
capitalist university, and with  critics rather too content with the 
unchallenging aim of addressing what they loosely term the “cultural 
imaginary” through the championing of new readings of literary texts? The 
intellectually (at least) exciting  challenges of representing an 
“Anthropocene” have reinvigorated criticism, especially of  the formal and 
ethical limits or capacities of the novel, but does the environmental crisis 
risk just becoming the latest occasion for the self-perpetuation of a given 
academic culture – with, for example,  its supposedly prestigious but 
environmentally irresponsible international conferences?  
  In some ways the spectrum of affect that can be labeled AH recalls some 
of the topics and tropes associated with postmodernism in the late 1980 
and early 1990s. At issue is a sliding indistinction of authentic and 
inauthentic emotion, concern and fake concern, action or its mere 
simulation. Here, however, the challenge to given notions of authentic self-
present subjectivity is not solely from the effects of consumer capitalism, 
with its contaminations of identity and commodity, and so on, but from more 
obscure scenarios of material entrapment and closure, for which  the major 
issue is the depersonalizing contamination of human and nonhuman 
agency (“We live in the age of unintended consequences” (Ulrich Beck) 
(Beck, 1999, p. 119).  
 
 Working through Grief and Horror 
Blühdorn argues that environmental thinkers need to confront the 
implications of the fact that “what eco-political discourse is, ultimately, all 
about, are limits of social acceptability, that is, concerns about violations of 
established social norms that are deemed unacceptable” (Blühdorn, 2015, 
p. 159). Objective data about collapsing ice shelves, disappearing species 
and future droughts do not “matter” in themselves any more than another 
bare fact, such as the size of a hill or the shape of a cloud. These data will 
matter to people only as they impinge upon and are seen to be “in conflict 
with, established social values, expectations and aspirations” (Blühdorn, 
2015, p. 159). Blühdorn highlights here the burning frustration and injustice 
felt by so many environmental activists, that, to most people in the 
developed world, even the threat of environmental collapse still makes less 
impact on their thinking than the cost of running a car. 
     Yet is this now shifting? There may be a more activating and potentially 
more positive side of AH. Its feeling of the unprecedented is become also 
witness to a growing crisis of legitimation as to such “established values, 
expectations and aspirations.” In the recent past, protests about 
environmental changes have become often more general but more 
vehement, focused less on some specific place or species under threat but 
on a different and on a refreshingly specific human target—on central 
governments. It is the very authority of central governments that is 
increasingly felt as simulative, a shift both exciting and potentially 
dangerous. Paul Leduc Browne writes: “Like money, which is worthless if 
no one believes in it, the state only exists as long as it receives at least the 
tacit support of a sufficient portion of the population over which it rules…” 
(Browne, 2018, p. 443). 
      This crisis of legitimacy makes itself felt in an increasing public 
dissatisfaction with mainstream “green” arguments – those that run along 
the familiar lines of how each individual can really make a difference by, 
say, using a different kind of car, eating less or no meat, and so on. A 
sense of individual powerlessness or insignificance in relation to such 
measures is certainly part of the feeling of AH – the powerlessness to make 
a difference individually. However, something that environmental thinkers 
have known for a long time is becoming a powerful element in broader 
public consciousness: the realization of how far such prescriptions, 
however valid in some ways, are also disingenuous, a displacing of 
responsibilities that must lie predominantly with the state. Browne 
observes: “Beyond campaigns designed to pressure states and 
corporations to change their behavior, there is a very limited potential for 
autonomous popular organization to change how resources are extracted, 
goods manufactured, people and commodities transported.” (Browne, 
2018, p. 447).    
      A crisis of legitimacy is being felt as a matter of the state, not of the 
individual. The partial transmutation of AH into politicized anger takes the 
often simple, even simplistic form of a refusal of the status quo, at least for 
the duration of a staged demonstration. A member of “Extinction Rebellion,” 
involved in blocking off roads in major cities in the UK stated: “We’ve all 
read the science, we know the story, the whole phase of denial is over and 
if it takes civil disobedience to make a difference then so be it” (quoted in 
Blackall, 2019).  
      A vague, pervasive sense of “tipping points” has the effect of making 
even the trivial seemingly tinged with risks, of heightening the stakes of day 
to day actions, sometimes almost to absurdity. A general loss of proportion 
even infects day to day life; the rational and the paranoiac blur into each 
other. The malaise of AH sharpens more often into some specific emotions: 
anger, even rage, fear, a loathing of government. The challenge becomes 
to make something precisely aimed, thoughtful and genuinely mitigating in 
effect from such inchoate emotions.  
     A future danger must be a reactive retreat into too exclusive a concern 
with the narrowest forms of identity politics. Scott Hamilton writes: 
“When groups feel threatened”, notes Amy Chua, commenting on the 
surge of identity politics in the USA after the 2016 election of 
President Donald Trump, “they retreat into tribalism.” What we see in 
recent racist and populist calls for “culture” and/or nationalism, 
therefore, is the political future of the Anthropocene contained today 
within the domestic framework of the “I.” (Hamilton, 2019).  
     As opposed to this reactionary drift, the environmental crisis has also 
given rise to a startling new form of inter-generational politics.  Eleanor 
Salter writes in the Independent newspaper for 11th July 2019: “Young 
people have been mobilizing to force climate justice onto the agenda 
because the established political order has failed to rise to the climate 
challenge” (Salter, 2019). It may be that the difference of generations is set  
to replace even issues of gender as the most prominent catalyst of the age 
for political activism. 
      Such a transmutation of AH into a more active, morally satisfying 
political anger is necessarily simplistic, given the complexities of all the 
social, political cultural, ecological and other issues (such as the near-
overwhelming fact that the agent of the Anthropocene is no one human 
entity at all, but a complex assemblage of human and nonhuman factors on 
differing scales). The risk is that the most likely response to intensifying 
activism  will be social breakdown followed by authoritarian repression. 
Nevertheless, it is also a disorienting chance to induce the dismantling of 
current norms of economics and politics.  
 
Notes 
1 I refer to my Ecocriticism on Edge (2015). The phrase “Anthropocene 
disorder” was coined:  
to name a new kind of psychic disorder, inherent in the mismatch 
between familiar day-to-day perception and the sneering voice of 
even a minimal ecological understanding or awareness of scale 
effects; and in the gap between the human sense of time and slow-
motion catastrophe; and, finally, in a  sense of disjunction between 
the destructive processes at issue and the adequacy of the 
arguments and measures being urged to address them. In response, 
the mind is suspended, uncertainly, between a sense of rage and 
even despair on one side, and a consciousness of the majority 
perception of such reactions as disproportionate and imbalanced on 
the other. (p. 140) 
2  An intellectual  focus on the issue of affect is timely, as it is now realized 
that the dominant aims of much environmental  work have rested on a one-
dimensional, rather naïve understanding  of the way feeling and affect are 
forces of political motivation: the realization that environmental problems 
cannot be understood  simply in terms of some public information deficit 
waiting to be filled—that if most people knew more they would act 
differently--or even, pace some ecocriticism, that the global problem  can 
be read as a failure of the social imagination that could be partly assuaged  
by celebrating the latest “cli fi” book or ecopoem, or by advocating some 
alternative ontology. 
 
3 Contrast the romanticism of some early ecocriticism. In a seminal 
anthology  Neil Everden endorsed  the supposedly  ecological ethics 
implicit in something Northrop Frye wrote about art, “that the goal of art is 
to “recapture, in full consciousness, that original lost sense of identity with 
our surroundings, where there is nothing outside the mind of man, or 
something identical with the mind of man”“ (Everden, 1996, p. 98). 
 
4 David Wood writes of Derrida’s argument: “The future is essentially a 
contest zone. It is important to remain open to the incalculable, and the 
unexpected, but it is at least as important to cultivate the institutions and 
the civic leadership that will take responsibility for a not so very incalculable 
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